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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between the size of an unfunded public pension
system and economic growth in an overlapping generation economy, in which altruistic parents
¯nance the education of their children and leave bequests. Unlike the existing literature, we
model intergenerational altruism by assuming that children's income during adulthood is an
argument of parental utility. Unfunded public pensions can promote growth when families face
liquidity constraints preventing them from investing optimally in the education of their children.
We consider two alternative ways of ¯nancing a public pension system, either by levying social
contributions in a lump-sum manner or in proportion to labour income. We ¯nd that there is
no case for unfunded public pensions in economies where bequests are operative. By contrast,
there exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension system in economies where bequests
are not operative and individuals are su±ciently patient.
Keywords: Public pension; Education; Growth
JEL classification system: H55, I20, D91ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 5
Non-technical summary
Unfunded public pension bene¯ts have a negative impact on private savings, since
individuals partially rely on these to ¯nance their retirement. The size of a public pension
scheme also a®ects the tax burden, since bene¯ts are typically ¯nanced by levying taxes on
labour (social security contributions). In addition, unfunded public pensions modify the
allocation of resources between generations, since today's bene¯ts are ¯nanced by current
social contributions. The overall impact of such a redistributive scheme on economic
activity mainly depends on individuals' reactions to taxes and bene¯ts.
Our main argument is that publicly-provided transfers between generations have an
impact on private transfers between parents and children. Parents ¯nance the education
of their children and leave them a bequest, provided that they are su±ciently wealthy.
In poor families, however, parents leave no bequests and cannot optimally ¯nance the
education of their children owing to liquidity constraints. Poor parents cannot borrow to
invest more in the education of their children, since they are forbidden by law to force
their children to reimburse them. By transferring resources from children to parents,
public intergenerational transfers alleviate such liquidity constraints, thereby increasing
the level of education. This is good for growth, provided that public pensions do not
o®set the favourable impact on human capital formation by crowding out savings.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the size of an unfunded public
pension system and economic growth in an overlapping generation model, in which altru-
istic parents may a®ect the income of their children through bequests and education. We
¯nd that there is no case for public pensions if transfers of both physical (bequests) and
human (education) capital are operative in the family. Public pensions do not a®ect the
economic equilibrium if they are ¯nanced by lump-sum social contributions, but are bad
for growth if they are ¯nanced by distortionary taxation. In contrast, public pensions can
be good for growth if parents leave no bequests. In such a situation, public pensions make
parents increase their consumption and educational spending. One has then to balance
the positive growth e®ects of enhanced human capital formation with the negative e®ects
of lower savings and physical capital. We show that, unless individuals are su±ciently
impatient, there exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension system.ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 6
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between the size of a public pension system and
economic growth in an overlapping generation economy, in which altruistic parents may
a®ect their children's income through education and bequests.
Individuals' reaction to ¯scal policy, which determines the e®ectiveness of policy mak-
ing in stimulating growth1, mainly depends on the span of their forecasting horizon. The
current income-driven consumer of the Keynesian paradigm is typically short-sighted,
which contrasts with the far-sighted Ricardian individual, who is able to see through the
government's intertemporal budget constraint and to counter the e®ects of ¯scal policy.
Whereas pay-as-you-go public pensions fully crowd out private savings in the textbook
version of overlapping generation models2, where individuals' horizons are limited to their
own life-cycle, successive generations of altruistic individuals are nested through a chain
of bequests, thereby making ¯scal policies ine®ective (Barro 1974).
A large body of literature has examined and quali¯ed the conditions under which
Ricardian equivalence holds in altruistic overlapping generation models (e.g., Abel 1987;
Weil 1987; Thibault 2000). If bequests are operative both before and after a policy change,
¯scal policy is then ine®ective. This literature is based on Barro's seminal assumption
that individual preferences are de¯ned by a recursive relation (a Bellman equation), which
extends the planning horizon of economic agents to in¯nity in spite of a ¯nite lifetime.
Regardless of bequests, signi¯cant altruistically-motivated transfers of human capital take
place in the family, as children are not capable of caring for themselves or making con-
tractual arrangements to self-¯nance education (Becker 1991). Drazen (1978), extending
Barro's model to transfers of both human capital (education) and physical capital (be-
quests), assumes that altruistic parents face a trade-o® between education and bequests,
which is determined by returns on investment in each type of capital. Parents invest in
the education of their children as long as the return on education is higher than the rate
of interest. The main result of this approach (see also Becker and Tomes 1986) is that
households who cannot leave bequests underinvest in the formation of their children's
human capital, inasmuch as the rate of return on education in these households remains
above the rate of interest. Parents cannot borrow to invest more in the education of
1For a review of the e®ectiveness of ¯scal policy in stimulating economic activity, see Hemming et al.
(2000).
2See Blanchard and Fisher (1989).ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 7
their children, since they are forbidden by law to force their children to reimburse them.
Obviously, publicly-provided intergenerational transfers such as unfunded public pension
bene¯ts can alleviate such a liquidity constraint by transfering resources from children to
parents, thereby increasing the level of education. This could enhance growth, provided
that public pensions do not o®set the favourable impact on human capital formation by
crowding out savings. The question addressed in this paper is, under which conditions of
preferences and technology can an increase in the size of a public pension system be good
for growth?
Our approach departs from much of the literature on public pensions and growth,
which assumes either that individuals have an in¯nite planning horizon and face binding
bequest constraints (Caball¶ e 1995) or that intergenerational transfers are motivated by
joy-of-giving altruism (Kaganovich and Zilcha 1999; Sanchez-Losada 2000). Kaganovich
and Zilcha consider only transfers of human capital and analyse the role of government's
allocation of revenue between public spending on education and social security bene¯ts,
in line with the literature on private versus public education (see Glomm and Ravikumar
1992). Our study however considers transfers of both human and physical capital, focusing
on the impact of public pensions on the allocation of private resources between education,
consumption, savings and bequests. In contrast to the existing literature, Sanchez-Losada
derives a new result that unfunded public pensions can increase growth in an economy
in which bequests are operative. However, this result is driven by the assumption of
joy-of-giving altruism, which bears two caveats: ¯rst, it does not allow for inoperative
bequests; second, the return on human capital is not related to the return on physical
capital. In our model we assume a form of altruism, adapted from Becker (1991), that
allows for a trade-o® between bequests and education driven by relative returns. Unlike
joy-of-giving or recursive altruism, this form of altruism posits that parents are concerned
for the income of their adult children (not for their utility), which they can a®ect by either
educating them or leaving a bequest. This intuitive assumption makes altruistic models
more tractable from a technical viewpoint than the recursive form of altruism advocated
by Barro and allows us to provide a full characterisation of the e®ect of public pensions
on growth.
In this framework we ¯nd that there is no case for public pensions if transfers of
both physical and human capital are operative in the family. The Ricardian equivalence
theorem applies to our model if bequests are operative and public pension bene¯ts areECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 8
¯nanced by lump-sum contributions. When contributions are proportional to labour
income, public pensions are bad for growth in an economy with operative bequests, since
their only e®ect is to distort parental choice between bequests and education. These
¯rst results are in line with most of the literature. However, there is a stronger case for
public pensions if parents leave no bequests. Providing publicly-¯nanced old age support
makes individuals increase not only their own consumption but also their educational
spending. One has to balance the positive e®ects of enhanced human capital formation
with the negative e®ects of lower savings and physical capital. We show that, unless
individuals are su±ciently impatient, there exists a growth-maximising size of the public
pension system. Interestingly, this result applies to both lump-sum and proportional
contributions. Finally, it should be made clear that our results are positive, not normative,
since we only look at the growth e®ect of public pensions and do not assess their welfare
e®ect.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we set up the basic model. In section
3, we study the balanced growth path, which is characterised by either operative or
inoperative bequests. In section 4, we examine the growth e®ect of an increase in the
scale of a public pension programme in an economy where bequests are inoperative. We
set out our concluding remarks in section 5.
2 The Model
The basic framework is an overlapping generation model µ a la Allais (1947)-Samuelson
(1958)-Diamond (1965), in which parents are altruistically concerned for the well-being
of their children. This concern is expressed by providing children with a disposable in-
come later on in life and departs from both joy-of-giving and recursive altruism. We
borrow this formulation from Becker (1991), who points out that wealth of children dif-
fers from expenditure on children. A parent faces a trade-o® between transfers of human
capital (education) and physical capital (bequests) to enhance the disposable income of
his children.
2.1 Individuals
The economy consists of a sequence of individuals who live for three periods: childhood,
adulthood and old-age. In the second period of their life, each individual gives birth
to 1 + n children, so that the population grows at a constant raten. In each periodECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 9
t; a new cohort consisting of Nt(= (1 + n)Nt¡1) identical individuals is born. During
childhood individuals do not make any decisions, as it is assumed that their consumption
is included in their parents' consumption. They are reared by their parents, who ¯nance
their education. When adult, they work and receive the market wage, consume, save and
rear their own children. When old, they are retired and leave a bequest xt+1 to each of
their 1 + n children.
During adulthood each individual born at t¡1 supplies inelastically ht e±ciency units
of labour, his level of human capital depending on his parents' spending on education. In
addition, each adult inherits xt from his parents so that his current income is:
!t ´ wtht + xt (1)
where wt is the wage rate per e±ciency unit of labour. Adults distribute their income
among own consumption, ct, spending on their children's education, (1 + n)et, and sav-
ings, st:
!t = ct + (1 + n)et + st (2)
During old-age individuals are retired and receive the proceeds of their savings. Each
individual leaves a bequest xt+1 to each of his 1 + n children. Old-age consumption is
simply equal to the proceeds of savings minus bequests:
dt+1 = Rt+1st ¡ (1 + n)xt+1 (3)
Bequests are assumed to be non-negative:
xt+1 ¸ 0 (4)
The human capital of each individual born at t, ht+1, is a function of his parents'






where D > 0 is a scale factor and ± 2 ]0;1[ denotes the elasticity of the technology of
education with respect to educational spending. Since an individual's level of human
capital only depends on his own parents' human capital and spending on education, there
is no intragenerational externality in human capital. Education is privately ¯nanced and
a family's decision on children's education does not impact on other families' humanECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 10
capital formation. The model, therefore, does not address the issue of public versus
private education and focuses on the impact of public pensions on privately-¯nanced
human capital formation.
An adult (in period t + 1) receives an income that consists of labour earnings and
inheritance:




t + xt+1 (6)
We assume that parents are altruistic towards their children and model this by making
the disposable income of their adult children, !t+1, an argument of their utility function.
Each individual born at t ¡ 1 has the following lifetime utility function:
Ut = (1 ¡ ¯)lnct + ¯ lndt+1 + ° ln!t+1 (7)
where 0 < ¯ < 1 and ° > 0 is the intergenerational degree of altruism. Children are
educated during chilhood (period t) and inherit during adulthood.
We now add public pension contributions and bene¯ts to an individual's budget con-
straints. Contributions can be levied either as lump-sum taxes (´t) or as proportional
labour income taxes (¿), whereas public pension bene¯ts are distributed in a lump-sum
way. We modify the budget constraints (1), (3) and (6) accordingly:
!t = (1 ¡ ¿)wtht ¡ ´t + xt (8)
dt+1 = Rt+1st + µt+1 ¡ (1 + n)xt+1 (9)




t ¡ ´t+1 + xt+1
(10)
An individual born in period t ¡ 1 is endowed with ht units of human capital at the
outset of adulthood and chooses et, st, ct, dt+1, xt+1 and !t+1 so as to maximise his
life-cycle utility (7) under constraints (2), (8), (9), (4) and (10). An individual's optimal















































t ¸ Rt+1 (15)
The rate of return on education is greater than (or equal to) the rate of interest. The rate
of return on education is modi¯ed by proportional contributions, but not by lump-sum
contributions. Both rates are equal when bequests are operative. In such a case we say
that private educational spending is optimal. When bequests are inoperative, the rate
of return on education is strictly higher than the rate of interest and the level of private
educational spending is suboptimal.
2.2 Firms
In each period t, production occurs according to a Cobb-Douglas technology using two






where A > 0 is a scale parameter and ® 2 ]0;1[ denotes the capital share. In each period
the stock of capital results from individuals' savings in the preceding period. In any period
t ¸ 1 we have:
Kt = Nt¡2st¡1 (17)
The initial stock of capital (K0) is given, and belongs to the N¡2 individuals, who are old
in period 0; each of them owns s¡1 = K0=N¡2.















t = (1 ¡ ®)Ak
®
t (18)
where kt = Kt=Ht is the physical to human capital ratio. Pro¯ts are rebated to capital










t (19)ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 12
2.3 Intertemporal equilibrium
The public pension scheme works as follows. The government in period t raises Nt¡1 (´t + ¿wtht)
in contributions from the adult and rebates the revenue to the current old. Each of the
Nt¡2 retirees in period t receives a lump-sum bene¯t, µt. The government's budget is
balanced in each period t:
µt = (1 + n)(´t + ¿wtht) (20)
To obtain a balanced growth path (along which all individual variables grow at the same
rate) we further assume that lump-sum social contributions are a fraction ´ 2 ]0;1[ of
total labour income, wtHt:
Nt¡1´t = ´wtHt
This implies:
µt = (1 + n)(´ + ¿)wtht
and
!t ´ (1 ¡ ¿ ¡ ´)wtht + xt
In the remainder of this paper we refer to ´ + ¿ as the public pension ratio. Given the
initial capital stock, k0 (= K0=N¡2 = s¡1), the initial level of human capital, h0, and
a public pension ratio ´ + ¿, a perfect foresight intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence
of quantities and prices fct;dt;kt;et;st;xt;wt;Rtg such that individuals maximise utility,
factor markets are competitive and all markets clear. The labour and the good market
clear:
Ht = Nt¡1ht (21)
Yt = Nt¡1 (ct + st + (1 + n)et) + Nt¡2dt (22)
According to Walras' law in period t, the equilibrium of the labour market implies that
of the good market. In each period we can substitute the old's budget constraint for the
equilibrium condition of the good market. Using (2), the expression (22) becomes:
dt + (1 + n)!t = (1 + n)Ak
®
t ht (23)
The intertemporal equilibrium is parameterised by the public pension ratio (´ and
¿), thereby allowing for an analysis of the growth e®ects of unfunded public pensions
¯nanced by either lump-sum or proportional contributions. In the next section we further
analyse the intertemporal equilibrium and show that, given values for the parameters, it
is characterised by either operative or inoperative bequests.ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 13
3 Dynamics
3.1 Operative bequests













The non-negative bequest condition, xt+1 = !t+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ´ ¡ ¿)wt+1ht+1 ¸ 0, de¯nes a
lower bound (Â) on the public pension ratio:
´ + ¿ ¸ 1 ¡
°
(1 ¡ ®)(¯ + °)
´ Â (26)
When the degree of altruism is su±ciently high, i.e. ° ¸ 1¡®
® ¯, this lower bound is
negative (Â · 0) and bequests are operative, regardless of the public pension ratio. When
the condition (26) is satis¯ed, (15) holds with equality. The combination of (15), (18)





(1 ¡ ¿)±D(1 ¡ ®)
®
kt+1 (27)
The expression (5) can be re-written as follows: ht+1 = De±




(1 ¡ ¿)± (1 ¡ ®)
etht
We also obtain simple expressions for savings (from Nt¡1st = Kt+1) and consumption
(from (11) and (25)):
st = (1 + n)kt+1ht+1 =
(1 + n)®
(1 ¡ ¿)±(1 ¡ ®)
etht (28)
ct =
(1 + n)(1 ¡ ¯)
®(¯ + °)
kt+1ht+1 =
(1 + n)(1 ¡ ¯)
(1 ¡ ¿)± (¯ + °)(1 ¡ ®)
etht (29)
We can therefore re-write the budget constraint of an adult:
!t = B (¿)etht (30)ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 14
where




(1 ¡ ¿)(¯ + °)±(1 ¡ ®)
+
®
(1 ¡ ¿)± (1 ¡ ®)
¶
(31)
B (¿) is increasing, while (1 ¡ ¿)B (¿) is decreasing. Given stocks of physical and human














decreases with ¿, whereas consumption and savings, which are proportional to et=(1 ¡ ¿),
increase. Next period's capital stock kt+1 is proportional to e
1¡±
t =(1 ¡ ¿); and increases
with ¿, since B (¿)(1 ¡ ¿)
1
1¡± is increasing. There are two e®ects at work; the direct
negative e®ect of a proportional tax reducing the perceived return on education combines
with a positive e®ect on savings and the accumulation of physical capital.
The educational spending per unit of human capital, et, is increasing with respect to
° and ¯, as:
@ ((1 + ¯=°)B (¿))
@¯
= ¡
(1 + n)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¿)±)
(1 ¡ ¿)±°
< 0





(1 + n)(1 ¡ ¯)
° (¯ + °)(1 ¡ ¿)±(1 ¡ ®)
< 0
More altruistic parents devote more resources to the education of their children. Patience
is also a positive determinant of parental spending on education.
The following proposition characterises the intertemporal equilibrium path with op-
erative bequests and establishes that lump-sum taxation is neutral and that proportional
taxation reduces the long-run growth rate.
Proposition 1 When the public pension ratio is not too low3, ´ + ¿ ¸ Â, there exists
a unique intertemporal equilibrium with operative bequests in each period, given initial
values for physical, k0 > 0, and human capital, h0 > 0. This equilibrium is characterised
by a sequence (kt;et) de¯ned by:
µ








B (¿)(1 + ¯=°)
(33)
This sequence converges monotonically towards a steady state (k;e) that de¯nes a balanced
growth path. Along the balanced growth path, all individual variables (!t;ct;st;et;dt;xt)
grow at the same rate as human capital4: ht+1=ht = De±. The intertemporal equilibrium is
independent from the lump-sum contribution ´, whereas the long-run growth rate decreases
with the proportional contribution ¿.
3This ratio only needs to be positive when Â · 0, i.e. ° ¸ 1¡®
® ¯.
4Hence the growth rate is given by De± ¡ 1.ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 15
Proof: The condition ´+¿ ¸ Â guarantees that there exists a temporary equilibrium
with operative bequests in each period t ¸ 0. In the initial period t = 0; the ¯rst
old allocates the proceeds of his savings, R0s¡1, between old-age consumption, d0, and
bequests, x0, to his 1 + n children; (24) and (25) give: !0 = 1
1+¯=°Ak®
0h0 and d0 =
(1+n)¯
¯+° Ak®
0h0. (24), (25), (27) and (29) then imply that (33) holds in any period t ¸ 0.
A sequence (kt;et) that satis¯es (33) together with ht+1 = De±
tht determines all variables
uniquely. These variables do not depend on ´. The sequence (kt) solution to (33) converges
monotonically towards a steady state k; the sequence (et) converges likewise towards
e = Ak®
B(¿)(1+¯=°).




B (¿)(1 + ¯=°)
µ
®
(1 ¡ ¿)±D(1 ¡ ®)
¶®








. The growth e®ect of an increase in propor-
tional contributions can be easily obtained by studying the function [(1 ¡ ¿)
®B (¿)]
¡1.
One easily sees that the derivative of this function is always negative, since for any ¿ ¸ 0:
®(1 ¡ ¿) ¡
1 ¡ ¯





In the long run the economy grows along a balanced growth path. All individual
variables grow at the same rate ht+1=ht = De±; while the capital stock, the wage rate and
the rate of interest are constant.¥
Public pensions do not foster growth when intergenerational transfers of both physical
and human capital are operative in the family. In the case of lump-sum contributions,
public pensions are neutral. In the case of proportional contributions, an increase in the
scale of a public pension system slows down growth, since taxes levied to ¯nance the
programme distort the educational choices of parents.
3.2 Inoperative bequests
When bequests are inoperative in period t + 1 (xt+1 = 0), (10) and (23) become:
!t+1 = (1 ¡ ´ ¡ ¿)wt+1ht+1 = (1 ¡ ´ ¡ ¿)(1 ¡ ®)Ak
®
t+1ht+1 (34)
dt+1 = (1 + n)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ´ ¡ ¿)(1 ¡ ®))Ak
®
t+1ht+1 (35)ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 16
The educational spending per unit of human capital, et ´ et=ht, satis¯es (12). Using








1 ¡ ´ ¡ ¿
¡ 1 + ®
¶
kt+1 (36)
This expression shows that, for kt+1 given, an increase in either proportional or lump-
sum contributions enhances educational spending. On the other hand, an increase in
contributions has a negative impact on kt+1 via savings. There is, therefore, the question
whether unfunded public pensions speed up or slow down growth in an economy where
bequests are inoperative. In this section we characterise the intertemporal equilibrium of
an economy with inoperative bequests, and we come to grips with this question in the
next.




(1 ¡ ¿)±D(1 ¡ ®)
®
kt+1
This and (36) de¯ne an upper bound on the public pension ratio:
´ + ¿ · 1 ¡
°
(1 ¡ ®)(¯ + °)
´ Â (37)
Bequests are inoperative when this inequality holds. Using ht+1 = De±





1 ¡ ´ ¡ ¿






We then obtain simple expressions for savings and consumption (using (11), (35) and
Nt¡1st = Kt+1):
st = (1 + n)kt+1ht+1 =
(1 + n)®¯ (1 ¡ ´ ¡ ¿)
°±(1 ¡ ¿)(® + (¿ + ´)(1 ¡ ®))
etht
ct =
(1 ¡ ¯)(1 + n)(® + (¿ + ´)(1 ¡ ®))
®¯
kt+1ht+1 =
(1 ¡ ¯)(1 + n)(1 ¡ ´ ¡ ¿)
°±(1 ¡ ¿)
etht
The budget constraint of an adult (2) becomes:
!t = e B (´;¿)etht (38)
where
e B (´;¿) = (1 + n)
µ
1 +
®¯ (1 ¡ ´ ¡ ¿)
°±(1 ¡ ¿)(® + (¿ + ´)(1 ¡ ®))
+
(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ´ ¡ ¿)
°± (1 ¡ ¿)
¶
The next proposition characterises the intertemporal equilibrium of an economy with
inoperative bequests.ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 17
Proposition 2 When the public pension ratio sati¯es ´ + ¿ < Â, there exists a unique
intertemporal equilibrium with inoperative bequests in each period, given initial values for
physical capital, k0 > 0, and human capital, h0 > 0. This equilibrium is characterised by
a sequence (kt;et) de¯ned by:









1 ¡ ´ ¡ ¿






This sequence converges monotonically towards a steady state (k;e) that de¯nes a balanced
growth path.
The proof of proposition 2 follows the same lines as that of proposition 1.
Our main purpose is now to assess the growth e®ect of a change in the size of a public
pension system when bequests are inoperative.
4 Public pensions and long-run growth
When bequests are operative, the intertemporal equilibrium is independent from the pub-
lic pension ratio in the case of lump-sum contributions. Bequests are operative and the
public pension programme is neutral, in line with Barro's (1974) Ricardian result. In-
dividuals are able to see through the government's intertemporal budget constraint and
to counter public transfers between generations. There is therefore no case for a pub-
lic pension system ¯nanced by lump-sum contributions when individuals are su±ciently
altruistic (° ¸ (1 ¡ ®)¯=®). In the case of proportional contributions, increasing the
size of a public pension system reduces the return on human capital, therefore harming
growth. It is well known that the Ricardian result of ¯scal policy neutrality only applies
to lump-sum transfers between generations.
When bequests are inoperative (Â > 0 or ° < (1 ¡ ®)¯=®), public pensions modify the
educational choices of parents even in the case of lump-sum contributions. In the absence
of public pensions (´ = ¿ = 0), parents' educational spending is suboptimal. Increasing
the public pension ratio alleviates the suboptimality of educational choices and is likely
to foster growth. Pension bene¯ts, all other things being equal, increase parents' lifetime
income and allow them to spend more on both their own lifetime consumption and the
education of their children. However, there are two e®ects working in opposite directions.
The ¯rst one is that, in an intertemporal framework, individuals receive social transfers
in old-age but pay social contributions, which impact negatively on their savings, therebyECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 18
reducing the accumulation of physical capital. The second is a general equilibrium e®ect:
lower levels of physical capital result in lower wages per unit of human capital, therefore
lowering the return on education. There is the question whether the positive e®ect can
dominate the negative e®ects of public pensions. In the case of proportional contributions
there is one additional negative e®ect of public pensions, since proportional taxes on labour
income reduce the return on education.
4.1 Lump-sum contributions (Â > ´ > 0, ¿ = 0)
We ¯rst consider the case of lump-sum contributions. Rearranging (39) in steady state
gives the following expression for the long-run educational spending per unit of human




(1 ¡ ´)(1 ¡ ®)A
e B (´;0)
µ
®¯ (1 ¡ ´)
°±D(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ´)(1 ¡ ®))
¶®
(40)
To assess the growth e®ect of an increase in the public pension ratio ´, one must char-
acterise the sign of @e
@´. We pursue the study of this derivative in appendix I, where we
show that @e










(1 ¡ ±)®(1 ¡ ®)° ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ ±¯ ¡ ®
2¯ (1 ¡ ±)
¢
Three cases therefore are possible:




negative for all ´ 2 [0;Â]. The negative e®ects of public pensions dominate the positive
e®ect for all levels of the public pension ratio. This case arises when individuals are
su±ciently impatient, i.e. they do not save much. The crowding out e®ect of public
pensions on savings dominates and public pensions harm growth.
Case B (Growth-maximising public pension ratio): If ©(0) > 0 > ©(Â), the
introduction of a public pension programme is good for growth. @e
@´ is positive as long as
©(´) is positive. There exists a threshold b ´ (= ©¡1(0)) above which a further increase in
the public pension ratio reduces growth. The public pension ratio b ´ corresponds to the
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Case C (Public pensions good for growth): If ©(Â) ¸ 0, @e
@´ is positive for all
´ 2 [0;Â], i.e. increasing the size of the public pension system promotes growth. This
case obtains for more restrictive values of the parameters.
In the proof of proposition 3 below, we show that the case C cannot obtain when the
elasticity of the technology of education with respect to educational spending (±) is above
a threshold, ± = 1¡2®
2(1¡®). To illustrate how the pattern of public pensions and growth
depends on patience and altruism we resort to a diagrammatic representation. The e®ect
of public pensions on growth depends on two key parameters characterising households'
behaviours, namely ¯, which represents thrift, and °, which indicates the strength of
parental concern for children. Figure 1 depicts the pattern of public pensions and growth,
when the elasticity of the technology of education is larger than ± = 1¡2®
2(1¡®). Figure 2
depicts this pattern in the case of a low elasticity of the technology of education (± < ±).
The three cases A, B and C are then possible, depending on the values taken by ° and ¯.
Insert ¯gures 1 and 2 here
The main results of this section are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If parents are su±ciently altruistic towards their children, i.e. ° ¸ 1¡®
® ¯,
bequests are operative and a public pension programme ¯nanced by lump-sum contributions
does not a®ect growth. If parents are not su±ciently altruistic towards their children, i.e.
° < 1¡®
® ¯, bequests are inoperative and the introduction of a public pension programme






There then exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension programme, b ´ · Â.
When the elasticity of the technology of education with respect to educational spending is
su±ciently high5, i.e. ± > ± = 1¡2®
2(1¡®), this maximum is interior (b ´ < Â) and the growth
rate decreases with the public pension ratio if the size of the system is larger than b ´.
Proof: The positive e®ect of public pensions on growth arises in the cases B and C.







5For a capital share ® equal to 1/3 condition, ± is equal to 1/4 and (41) requires ¯ > 1=2.ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 20
We have b ´ < Â in the case B and b ´ = Â in the case C.
Moreover, we have ©(Â) ¸ 0 in the case C, which is equivalent to:
(1 ¡ ±)° ¸
1
1 ¡ ®





Using this and the condition Â > 0 (, ° < 1¡®
® ¯) we obtain:






; since ¯ · 1
This implies: ± < 1¡2®
2(1¡®) = ±. The case C is therefore excluded for ± > ±.¥
In the case A, increasing the size of a public pension system bears a negative e®ect
on growth, since it makes individuals save less, thereby decreasing the accumulation of
physical capital and growth. This negative e®ect on growth dominates the positive e®ect
on human capital formation.
In the case B, increasing the size of a public pension system has a positive e®ect on
growth until the system has reached its growth-maximising size. Increasing further the
size of the system has a negative impact on growth. Typically, this is an example of
non-linearities in the pattern of public pensions and growth
In the case C, increasing the size of a public pension system has always a positive im-
pact on growth until bequests become operative. Individuals must be su±ciently patient
and have a degree of altruism su±ciently close to the level that would make them leave
bequests (i.e., 1¡®
® ¯). In addition, this case is ruled out if the elasticity of the technology
of education with respect to educational spending is su±ciently high. For instance, if the
physical capital share is larger than 1/2, this case is excluded. For a capital share of 1/3,
this case is excluded if the elasticity of the technology of education is larger than 1/4.
4.2 Proportional contributions (´ = 0, Â > ¿ > 0)
When bequests are operative, increasing the size of a public pension system ¯nanced by
proportional contributions is bad for growth, since it reduces the incentives for human
capital formation. By contrast, this section shows that there is a case for a public pension
programme ¯nanced by proportional contributions when bequests are not operative.
Bequests are inoperative as long as the tax rate does not exceed an upper bound:
¿ < 1 ¡
°
(1 ¡ ®)(¯ + °)
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By assumption, individuals are not too altruistic, i.e. Â > 0 , ° < ¯ (1 ¡ ®)=®. We
have a new expression for the long-run educational spending per unit of human capital
(see proposition 2):
e









e B (0;¿)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¿))
®
and







°± (1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¿))
¶
The study of the ¯rst derivative of e with respect to ¿ is carried out in appendix II, where
we establish that the derivative @e
@¿ has the same sign as a function ª(¿), which decreases
from








2(1 ¡ ® ¡ ±) + °¯ (®(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ±) + (1 ¡ ®)¯
2 ¡ ¯ ¡ ®°
¢
We again ¯nd three possible cases:
Case A' (Public pensions bad for growth): If ª(0) · 0, i.e. ¯ ·
®(2¡®)(1+°±)
1¡® ,
increasing the size of a public pension system slows down growth for all ¿ 2 ]0;Â[.
Case B' (Growth-maximising public pension ratio): If ª(0) > 0 > ª(Â),
increasing the size of a public pension system promotes growth for ¿ · b ¿ and reduces
growth for ¿ > b ¿, where b ¿ is the solution to ª(¿) = 0:
Case C' (Public pensions good for growth): If ª(Â) > 0, an increase in the size
of a public pension system promotes growth for all ¿ 2 ]0;Â[.
In the proof of proposition 4 below we show that the case C' obtains only if the




(2¡®)(1¡®). It is worth noting that ±
0
< ±. Another di®erence with the lump-
sum case is that the frontier between C' and B' is not a line, but a curve de¯ned by
ª(Â) = 0. Apart from that, the diagrammatic representation of the pattern of public
pensions and growth is qualitatively similar to that obtained in the case of lump-sum
social contributions.
The next proposition summarises the main results of this section.ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 22
Proposition 4 If parents are su±ciently altruistic towards their children, i.e. ° ¸ 1¡®
® ¯,
bequests are operative and a public pension programme ¯nanced by proportional contribu-
tions has a negative e®ect on growth. If parents are not su±ciently altruistic towards their
children, i.e. ° < 1¡®
® ¯, bequests are inoperative and the introduction of a public pension
programme promotes growth if and only if individuals are su±ciently patient, i.e.:
¯ >
®(1 + ±°)(2 ¡ ®)
1 ¡ ®
(42)
There then exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension system (b ¿ · Â). If the




maximum is interior, (b ¿ < Â) and the growth rate decreases with the size of the system if
the public pension ratio is larger than b ¿.





®(2 ¡ ®)(1 + °±)
1 ¡ ®
The case C' arises if and only if:
ª(Â) ¸ 0 , ®° (1 ¡ ® ¡ ±) ¡
¯
°
(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)¯) ¸ ® + ¯ (± ¡ ®(1 ¡ ®)) (43)
This cannot occur if ± > 1 ¡ ®.
Let us now deal with the case ± < 1 ¡ ®. If ± < 1 ¡ ®, the LHS of (43) is increasing
with °. Since ° < 1¡®
® ¯ (, Â > 0), (43) implies:
¯ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ® ¡ ±) ¡
®
(1 ¡ ®)







Since ¯ < 1, this inequality further implies:
± <
1 ¡ 3® + ®2




The case C' cannot therefore occur if ± > ±
0
.¥
As far as the assessment of a public pension programme is concerned, the case of
proportional contributions is qualitatively similar to the case of lump-sum contributions,
although there is one additional negative e®ect of public pensions on growth owing to
distortionary taxation.ECB • Working Paper No 90 • November 2001 23
5 Conclusion
A substantial body of empirical literature investigates the relation between taxation, pub-
lic spending and growth. Barro (1991) and Leibfritz et al. (1997) point to a negative im-
pact of taxation on growth. Kneller et al. (1999) ¯nd that distortionary taxation reduces
growth, whereas productive government expenditure enhances growth. According to this
body of literature public pensions, which are ¯nanced by distortionary contributions and
consist of transfers between individuals, would tend to have a negative impact on growth.
Empirical evidence, however, is inconclusive and many researchers have suggested that
there may be non-linearities in the pattern of taxation, public expenditure and growth.
Increasing public expenditure or taxes may be good for growth when starting from a low
level and bad for growth when starting from a high level. Our model provides a theoretical
case of non-linearities in the pattern of unfunded public pensions.
From a theoretical viewpoint, there is a case for public pensions only if individuals
initially leave no bequests. When bequests are not operative, the family fails to reap
the full gain of investment in human capital, which then o®ers a higher return than
physical capital. Pension bene¯ts may alleviate this market failure by giving parents
more resources to invest in the human capital of their children. Two opposing e®ects
are nevertheless at work, since public pensions increase investment in human capital (a
positive e®ect on growth) but reduce savings (a negative e®ect on growth). In an economy
with inoperative bequests, an unfunded public pension system enhances growth if parents
are su±ciently patient (given their degree of altruism), i.e they save enough for providing
¯nances for their old-age. A su±cient degree of patience moderates the adverse e®ect of
public pensions on savings and physical capital.
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7 Appendix
I- Lump-sum contributions:
We de¯ne a new variable, which varies from
°
¯ to 1¡®







¡ 1 + ®
¶
´ v(´)








where m = °±(1 ¡ ®)+1¡¯ +®¯ and C =
(1¡®)A°±
(±D)®(1+n). Clearly, @e
@´ is of the same sign as
H0 (v). Taking the logarithmic derivative of H (v); we ¯nd that @e
@´ is of the same sign as:
P (v) = ¡±(1 + ®)®¯v
2 ¡ ®mv + (1 ¡ ®)
2°


























(1 ¡ ±)®(1 ¡ ®)° ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ ±¯ ¡ ®
2¯ (1 ¡ ±)
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II- Proportional contributions:




e B (0;¿)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¿))
®







; since the contribution rate vary, by assumption, between 0 and Â = 1 ¡
°
(1¡®)(¯+°). We can then study a simpler function:
G(x) =
1 ¡ x








The logarithmic derivative of G has the same sign as:
¡(x) = ¡(1 ¡ ®)(°± + 1 ¡ ¯)x
2 ¡ ®(¯ (1 ¡ ®) + °± + 1)x + ®¯ (1 ¡ ®)
The function ª(¿) ´ ¡(x(¿)) decreases from:













2(1 ¡ ® ¡ ±) + °¯ (®(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ±) + (1 ¡ ®)¯
2 ¡ ¯ ¡ ®°
¢
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